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This article examines discourse about Internet addiction and video-game-related sui-
cide in the People’s Republic of China. Through an analysis of media reportage, inter-
view transcripts, and chat rooms, a preliminary account of the origins of contemporary 
Chinese concerns with Internet addiction is provided. This approach differs from 
biomedical models, which see Internet suicide as a form of mental illness, similar to 
drug or gambling addiction. This approach draws on anthropological and sociological 
models of the cultural construction of social problems and argues that concerns with 
Internet addiction are part of a more general moral crisis faced by Chinese, in response 
to rapid consumerism, the medicalization of mental illness, and new forms of public 
and publicity.
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From late 2005 through 2006, American mainstream media began covering events of “Internet suicide” and “Internet addiction” in the People’s Republic of China. 
Although this coverage reflects America’s fascination with Asia as an exotic site 
of technological sophistication (for a Japanese example, see Allison, 2006), it also 
reflects the spectacular nature of some of the most widely reported Internet sui-
cides in China. In 2004, for instance, a child leaped to his death in Tianjin, leaving 
behind a four-page confession detailing his deeply emotional ties to the characters 
in Warcraft III. But cases of Internet addiction and Internet suicide are more than 
engaging exoticisms from “the East.” It is clear that Chinese discussions of addic-
tion to the Internet and video games resonate with contemporary American debates 
on the subject. As in the United States, Chinese worry about Internet addiction, 
wangluo chengyin (᫪伵ګ䷗), and the set of tropes used to describe immersive 
gaming—being “immersed” (chenjin ި௦), “submerged” (chenni ިᄴʼ, or (most 
strongly) chenmi ިಮ—infatuated, addicted, or even in a coma—would be familiar 
to anyone who follows Internet addiction debates in the United States.
It is tempting, therefore, to include the Chinese case in a larger, cross-cultural 
study of Internet and video game addiction, and indeed the literature is growing 
on this topic. We take a slightly different anthropological approach to Internet 
addiction, drawing on a variety of theoretical sources and frameworks from medical 
anthropology, science and technology studies, and the sociology of social problems. 
We examine how biomedical diagnoses of Internet addiction are “co-produced” with 
larger social and political issues in contemporary China.
By attempting to contextualize discourses of suicide and addiction, we argue that 
they crystalize concerns for more general changes in the “moral order” of China. 
Drawing on Kleinman’s (1998) work on “experience and its moral modes,” we 
argue that Chinese reportage expresses a profound sense that Internet addiction is 
emblematic of socioeconomic change in China and underlying moral tensions. As 
such, this articulates awareness and concern with fear of a threatened moral order 
in the face of social change, medicalization of social relationships, the rise of new 
forms of self-fashioning enabled by new media that are not socially sanctioned, 
the growth of consumerism as a lifestyle, and the dilemmas of childrearing and 
family structure in a changing country. As one poster to a Chinese online forum 
put it, China today is “just like the Qing empire”—full of the promise of a growing 
cosmopolitanism that will strengthen China and integrate it into a global political 
system but also exposed to foreign influences that may lead to its downfall.
We draw here in a very preliminary way on Chinese media reportage, chat 
room transcripts, and blogs to describe the terms in which contemporary Chinese 
discuss Internet addiction, compulsive game play, and their treatment in terms of 
mental illness. Although these data are ethnographically superficial, we believe 
these narratives can provide provisional answers to questions regarding the cultural 
context of gaming in the Asia-Pacific region. How would one undertake a rigorous 
Golub, Lingley / “Just Like The Qing Empire”  3
comparative ethnography of Chinese and American video game habits? How do 
video games fit in China’s rapid modernization, especially with the rise of Chinese 
consumer culture? Finally, how do video games provide a resource for Chinese 
people to undertake new forms of self-fashioning at the turn of a new millennium?
This article employs perspectives used in the sociological literature on social 
problems, medicalization, and moral panic, as well as the wider literature in medical 
anthropology. Although we do not seek to trivialize the pain of mental illness or dismiss 
reports of Internet addiction as “false,” we insist that these cases be put back into the 
wider context of contemporary Chinese life. Despite the popularity of such diagnoses 
in both China and the United States, there is no widely accepted definition of Internet 
addiction as a form of psychopathology, and many within the scientific community are 
skeptical of research indicating its existence (Widyanto & Griffiths, 2006).
We draw on Jasanoff’s (2004) concept of co-production to argue that discourses 
of Internet addiction “are at once products of social work and constitutive of forms 
of life; society cannot function without knowledge any more than knowledge 
can exist without appropriate social supports.” Psychiatric evaluation of Internet 
addiction, then, “is not a transcendent mirror of reality,” but in fact “embeds and is 
embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions, discourses, instruments 
and institutions” (Jasanoff, 2004, pp. 2–3). Thus diagnoses of Internet addiction are 
co-produced with larger social and political issues.
In sum, we argue that the Internet does not simply “impact” Chinese culture 
any more than Chinese single-handedly create an environment for a culture-bound 
syndrome known as Internet addiction. Rather, information technology is one 
element that interacts with cultural structures, recent history, and politico-economic 
context, which produces contemporary Chinese social life including both medical 
diagnoses of Internet addiction and the social order they in turn create.
We begin by tracing the history of Internet anxiety in China, media coverage 
of spectacular Internet suicides, and the rise of fears about Internet addiction as a 
form of mental illness. We then move to a wider discussion of suicide in China and 
the social change the country is currently undergoing. In doing so, we attempt to 
create a model of social change that explains not only the prevalence of “Internet 
addiction” but also the prevalence of concern about the disorder. In the third section 
of the article, we demonstrate the applicability of our new model through an analysis 
of some of the discourse surrounding Internet addiction in China. In conclusion, we 
summarize our findings and discuss further research.
Anxiety About the Internet in China
The Internet has always been viewed with ambivalence by the Chinese government. 
On the one hand, the Internet is both a symbol and a means of modernization key 
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to China’s development. On the other, the Internet provides access to material the 
Chinese government deems unsuitable and creates a new “public sphere” in which 
activists can communicate and organize (G. Yang, 2003). As a result, the Chinese 
government has attempted to institute different methods of restricting Internet 
content, beginning with the “great firewall of China,” which began operation in 1995 
(Barme & Ye, 1997) and continues today.
The growth of an Internet-mediated public sphere, which serves as a “third place” 
for interaction (Steinkuehler & Williams, 2006), has led to new physical locations 
for Internet users. Wang ba (᫪ܣ), or Internet cafés, have become gathering places 
where people who do not own a computer at home—most people—can access mas-
sively multiplayer online games (MMOGs), chat rooms and e-mail. As loci for mor-
ally dangerous Internet access, they are also imagined as morally unsuitable public 
places—especially since the deaths of a dozen people in a fire in 2002—and have 
been portrayed as physically unsafe (Jenkins, 2002). Consider, for instance, the fol-
lowing discussion of Internet cafés:
The environment at Web bars is troubling. Web bars are narrow, dark, stuffy, and the 
air in them is foul. Fire-fighting installations in some Web bars are crude and present 
serious safety hazards. Web bars provide their habitues with a dissolute cultural atmo-
sphere in which they can behave without any inhibitions. A substantial number of the 
netizens at Web bars are students, but undesirable young people from society can be 
found. Some Web bars sell various kinds of cigarettes and cigars, wine, soft drinks, and 
snacks. Youngsters do as they please here, get in the bad habits of smoking and drink-
ing, and frequently create disturbances. All these things have highly deleterious effects 
on youngsters’ physical and mental health. (S. Yang, 2006, p. 73)
The result is a long series of government attempts to regulate Internet cafés (Qiu 
& Zhou, 2005). Most recently, for instance, the Chinese government announced a
1-year moratorium on licensing new Internet cafés (“China Won’t Allow,” 2007).
Bizarre and pathological behavior created by the Internet and online games has 
featured prominently in the Chinese press since 2002: A boy murdered his uncle 
to steal money to play video games (Xinhua News Agency, 2006); two children 
exhausted by gaming marathons fell asleep on railroad tracks and were killed 
(Watts, 2005); a man murdered another over the theft of a virtual sword in Mir II 
(Watts, 2005); a 13-year-old committed suicide after playing Warcraft III (Xinhua 
News Agency, 2006); four teenagers were seriously injured in a knife fight between 
19 gamers at an Internet café over treasure dropped by a monster in an MMOG 
(Liaoshen Evening News, 2006); a 17-year-old killed himself after meeting his 
online sweetheart “Flying Skirt” in real life, only to find she was a homely woman 
in her 30s (Xinhua News Agency, 2005); and a morbidly obese man died after a 
marathon gaming session (“Online Addict Dies,” 2007).
These popular reports have been accompanied in recent years by academic 
studies indicating the growth of Internet addiction as a mental disorder. In 2005, 
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reports from the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the China Youth Association 
Network indicated that Internet addiction was a serious problem in China (Funk, 
2007). The Institute of Psychology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences estimated 
that a university of 5,000 students typically loses 50 students a year, and 80% of the 
dropout rate is due to Internet addiction (Funk, 2007). Most recently, the Chinese 
government has begun to sponsor eight clinics to treat Internet addicts (Cha, 2007).
Contemporary notions of Internet addiction as a pathology draw from biomedical 
models of mental illness, and the creation of clinics for treatment clearly treat 
Internet addiction on the model of gambling or drug addiction. These institutions 
seem to have been influenced by the scholarly work of Kimberly Young (1998), 
who has also produced an extensive array of popular self-help books designed to 
help people overcome Internet addiction. However, these Chinese clinics work on 
a much more carceral model of treatment than Young suggests, combining various 
drug regimes with regular intravenous drips and—most well-known—administering 
electric shock for extreme patients (Cha, 2007; Funk, 2007). It should be noted 
that the psychological literature on Internet addiction is ambivalent—there is no 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th edition, text revision; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2000) entry for Internet addiction and addiction 
experts are critical of claims that video games are addictive (Steenhuysen, 2007). 
Recent reviews of the literature (Widyanto & Griffiths, 2006) find much of the work 
on Internet addiction to be problematic. Chinese adoption of the idea of Internet 
addiction thus involves the adoption of a new and controversial diagnosis, rather 
than importing well-established medical models from the West (as was the case in 
early periods in the history of psychology; Chen, 1999).
The controversial nature of Western research on video game addiction has not 
stopped opponents of Internet games. Indeed, several clinic directors consider the 
relationship between drugs and video games is more than merely metaphorical. 
Indeed, drug regimes are used to treat patients as a substitute for the Internet. Hence 
clinic director Tao’s claim, “We use these medicines to give them happiness, so they 
no longer need to go on the Internet to be happy” (Cha, 2007, p. A01). Treatment 
of Internet addiction with pharmaceuticals presents a model of human emotion in 
which subjective experience can be created in individuals through the application 
of various drugs. Given the stark biomedical view of subjectivity expressed in this 
quote, it is not surprising that the experience of spending time on the Internet could 
be literally understood as physical addiction.
The Internet is equated with addictive drugs, not only at the level of the individ-
ual; it is also regarded as a social problem. The overwhelming concern with Internet 
addiction in China is the way in which it will effect Chinese development—a deep-
seated theme that speaks to old Maoist and pre-Maoist rhetoric of independence 
from colonialism as well as deeper Chinese concerns with ethical and spiritual cul-
tivation and refinement. The Internet is therefore equated not simply with addictive 
drugs in general but with opium and opium’s long association with a wide range of 
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social problems in China. This equation is made quite clear by Tian Bingxin (2005), 
who interviewed Zhang Chunliang, an anti-Internet crusader, on a Chinese Web site. 
Tian Bingxin claimed
The allure of Internet games for children is like the poison of opium in China so 
many years ago; it doesn’t discriminate between the poor and the rich, between those 
of high or low position. It doesn’t matter if you’re an unemployed worker, a wealthy 
businessman, or a Party cadre, the highest hopes of innumerable parents for their 
children’s future may well be destroyed by Internet games.Zhang then agreed: “We 
can say that if Internet games are not properly controlled, they may well become the 
21st century’s ‘electronic opium’ and ‘spiritual opium’” (as cited in Tian Bingxin, 
2005). By equating the Internet with opium, these anti-video-game crusaders draw 
a parallel between China’s rapid modernization through the importation of foreign 
technology on one hand and the spread of opium addiction and subsequent humili-
ation of the Qing empire (in the Opium Wars of the mid-19th century) on the other. 
The fall of China and its victimization by Europeans and Japanese is the paradig-
matic event from which nationalist politics seeks to recover.
It is this memory of opium dens that seems to inform Zhang’s claim: “From 
modern cities with forests of skyscrapers, to closed-off and backward traditional 
farming villages, wang ba have spread with the swiftness of a toxin; Internet games 
have become attached to the social body like poisonous tumors.” As a result, Internet 
games “bring originally fortunate and happy families to a frightening state, and 
seriously weaken people’s sense of social morality” (as cited in Tian Bingxin, 2005). 
As this last quote suggests, Internet addiction is more than “merely” a new form of 
illness in China; it is seen as pernicious and deadly because it threatens to affect 
the downfall of China, just as the importation of opium did. The real threat is not 
concerned merely with the bodies and minds of those addicted but also their family 
and society’s moral order.
Explaining Notions of Addiction
What factors explain the rising interest in Internet addiction and Internet suicide 
in China? Anthropologists would insist that because all perception is mediated by 
culture, explanations of suicide are never merely an empirical response to objective 
circumstances. Rather, the creation and diffusion of notions of addiction and public 
problems is a process shaped by cultural forces at work within the arena in which 
the problem develops. In the case of China, it is salient that suicide is a topic of 
enormous cultural elaboration.
It is important, for instance, to note that recent diagnoses of Internet suicide rely 
on the perception that suicide is caused by mental pathology. This is a noticeable 
shift in China, where psychiatrists have resisted the “medicalization” of suicide 
and have seen it instead as a powerful but ambiguous response to social and moral 
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dilemmas. As Lee and Kleinman (2003) demonstrated, suicide in China is often 
culturally inflected as a form of “resistance,” which is morally ambivalent. They 
pointed out that in China “suicide is often seen to be a rejection of everything in 
society on the level of cultural production, and compels members of society to 
doubt its core values” (Lee & Kleinman, 2003, p. 292). Although polluting, suicide 
can “be seen as an active moral act inasmuch as it is meant to show that even death 
is preferable to living under unacceptable political conditions” (p. 296). At once 
shaming and polluting, suicide can also be seen as moral, and indeed, committing 
suicide can become a moral imperative in certain social situations.
In the classical tradition, famous figures such as the righteous scholar and 
bureaucrat Qu Yuan committed suicide to escape an unjust legal regime (Lee & 
Kleinman, 2003, p. 298). This theme is related to other stories of virtuous world-
ignoring asceticism in which morally upright figures agree to sacrifices such as 
death, castration, or exile to maintain their personal integrity, or as the price paid 
to complete a valued project (McNeill & Sedlar, 1970, pp. 135–136). But as Hsieh 
and Spence (1980) showed, suicide is especially a moral imperative for women 
forced into no-win positions. Here suicide consists of not only an implicit critique 
of the regime that forces one to commit suicide but a positive act of Confucian 
moral virtue.
These cultural traditions help explain the distinct patterning of suicide in contemporary 
China. Today suicide continues to be a major social problem with a distinctive form. 
Globally, men are more likely to kill themselves than women, and classic sociological 
approaches that focus on such anomie predict that suicide rates will be higher in urban 
areas, where the pathological forces of modernity are concentrated. In fact, as numerous 
studies have shown, in China women are more likely to successfully commit suicide 
than men, and suicide rates in rural areas are three times higher than in urban areas (Ji, 
Kleinman & Becker, 2001; Phillips, Liu, & Zhang, 1999). Suicide is a serious public 
health concern in China, with high occurrence and depressing statistics.
In contrast, studies on Internet suicide in China focus on the dangers posed to 
male, urban, affluent students—the demographic that appears not to be at risk in the 
population more generally. Suicides in China often result from the pressures young 
women are subjected to in rural areas, where their lives are tightly constrained 
by prearranged marriages and strong pressure to produce male children. In other 
words, the “real” problem with suicide in China is the large numbers of deaths of 
female peasants—not affluent young men whose families can afford to send them 
to private clinics.
Of course, the Chinese press cover spectacular rural female as well as Internet-
related suicides, and it is not particularly surprising that the press disproportionately 
focuses on the suicide of those with high-status such as well-to-do young men. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that fears about Internet suicide in China and the underlying 
addiction that supposedly causes it cannot be explained simply by the fact.
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MMOG as Moral Crisis
To those who are familiar with the history of new media and social change in the 
United States, the moral debate surrounding new forms of publicity and technology 
in China will sound familiar. Concerns about Chinese youth moving online seem to 
mirror anxieties about social transformation in the 19th century in the United States as 
the population shifted from largely agrarian to urban communities—anxieties centered 
on the nature of moral order in the cities. As Boyer (1978) pointed out, reformers had 
“the conviction—explicit or implicit—that the city, although obviously different from 
the village in its external, physical aspects, should nevertheless replicate the moral 
order of the village” (p. x). This type of concern is analogous to social change in China 
in many ways. In Maoist thought, of course, the countryside and rural agrarian work 
was emphasized over corruption in the city. At the same time, there is massive urban 
growth in China and migration to cities in defiance of hukou (local residence permit) 
policies. Finally, as Steinkuehler et al. have pointed out (Steinkuehler & Williams, 
2006), MMOGs function as “third places” for youth, resulting in virtual worlds 
that create a new “public space” in which interactions can occur—interactions that 
threaten to create a civil sphere whose presence may not be welcome by the Chinese 
government or that may seem pathological to other players.
It is not surprising, therefore, that invocations of dark, threatening wang ba seem 
to mirror reformist concerns about spaces such as penny arcades and movie theaters 
(Nasaw, 1993) in the early 20th century. Similarly, Chinese fears of psychopathology 
induced by new media mirror an ensemble of concerns in the United States, which 
revolve around many forms of new media including broadcast radio (Dennis, 1998), 
television (Barker & Petley, 1997) and video games (Williams, 2003).
In sum, fears of Internet suicide in China might be prompted by concern over 
changes to the underlying moral order of Chinese society in the face of not only the 
spread of the Internet but wider social changes as well. We review some of these 
changes in the next section.
Changing Selves and Changing Societies
In contemporary China social relations are being reordered by changes in con-
sumer culture, of which the Internet is only a part. These new forms of selfhood and 
self-creation alter the structure of families as well as individual subjectivities. As 
Farquhar and Zhang (2005) pointed out in their work on biopolitics in Beijing, many 
individuals in China today are seeking ways to recuperate such subjectivities in the 
aftermath of the Agambenian “bare life” they were subjected to during the Cultural 
Revolution. One of the main forces driving this change is China’s “consumer revolu-
tion” (Davis, 2000). China today is undergoing massive socioeconomic change, and 
nowhere is this more evident than the rise in consumerism (Yan, 2000). Internet use 
in China is also soaring: The number of users online increased to 23% in 2006, with 
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30% of the Beijing population currently online (China Internet Network Information 
Center, 2007). The transformation of middle-class Chinese lifestyles thus involves 
what Farrer (2002) called “opening up”—experimentation with new forms of iden-
tity and association through consumerism and the Internet. As Yan (2000) argued,
booming consumerism is not merely a reflection of the booming economy; rather, it 
also reflects the changing social system and facilitates further changes in the system, 
such as redrawing the boundaries between social groups, creating social space outside 
state control and forming a new ideology. (p. 179)
In sum, consumerism allows new ways for people to “build their identities from 
the ground up” (Chen, 2001) in a new environment in which there has been a “radi-
cal valorization of the personal” (Farquhar, 1996, p. 240). Chinese youth culture 
places great emphasis on “self-expression” (ziwo biaoda, ۞ݺ।㧃). New forms 
of subjectivity made available can be seen in the literature on the simultaneous 
“opening up” of both the Chinese economy and Chinese social mores (Farrer, 2002; 
Friedman, 2005; Rofel, 1994), part of a “new culture of cool” (Yu, Chan, & Ireland, 
2007), in which self-expression is paramount.
In the realm of medicine, Chen (2001) identified that “in the process of market 
revitalization, health-seeking practices” have “changed as consumers renegotiated 
shifting boundaries and meanings of medical care” (p. 165). As a result of 
transnational pharmaceuticals and health care products, “the array of goods has 
introduced to Chinese consumers specific ideals of health, wealth and happiness in 
the form of individual regimens that diverge greatly from early socialist ideals of 
social welfare” (Chen, 2001, p. 177). At the same time as consumerization and new 
forms of self-making have occurred in China, consumerism is tied to a rise in the 
medicalization of human well-being.
As Chen (2001) showed, market reform in China has lead to the decline of the 
public health care system at the same time as biomedical notions of health are 
entering China. Focus on traditional practices such as Qigong are being replaced 
by emphasis on access to medication, and individual health care is becoming 
increasingly the prerogative of the wealthy, as reform forces clinics to prescribe 
expensive drugs to fund budgets no longer supported by the state. Also traditional 
medicines (which take a long time to prepare) and more communal notions of self-
improvement are being displaced by consumerized biomedical notions of health. 
These constitute changes that “emphasize the individual as a project of self-identity 
and self-representation,” which is both profoundly personal and “mediated by state 
and national agendas” (Chen, 2001, p. 12).
Similarly, Chen (1999) noted that psychiatry in China has passed through three 
stages that range from early Christian missionary work in treating the mentally ill, 
through Maoist notions of developing the minds and hearts of populations (based 
on Soviet models), to more globalized psychiatry in which “‘mental hygiene’ is 
intertwined with biomedical practices to underscore a prevailing state discourse 
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on the need for order and normality” (p. 311). These new psychiatric models see 
institutions as “centers of medical science where mental illness can be treated as a 
disease and not as a social deviation” (p. 313).
At the same time, the rise of entrepreneurial, private health care has created 
“doctors [who] try to become known (in carefully gauged publicity) as effective, 
experienced and unique. They embody medicine, grounding their practice and its 
appeal to patients in their own special features as clinicians” (Farquhar, 1996, p. 247). 
Although Farquhar is speaking here about rural doctors, the modern rise of celebrity 
doctors and Internet crusaders, such as Tao Ran and Zhang Chunliang, indicate that 
this method of selling health care with “an aura” in the Benjaminian sense is still 
active in China today.
Thus, in contemporary China, biomedical psychiatric treatment comes to be seen 
not so much as a form of self-making for the subject of the treatment but rather as a 
consumerist approach to eliminating social discord in the family. This is particularly 
relevant in the treatment of Internet addiction, because such treatment is usually sought 
by parents on behalf of their children. In such a view, it becomes unnecessary for a 
parent to resolve conflict with a child, when it is possible to pay someone to perform 
operations on the child’s body, so they will no longer be in conflict with the parent.
Discourse of Moral Crisis
An analysis of the wider social field in contemporary China lends credence to 
the claim that biomedical discourse of Internet addiction grew alongside an impend-
ing sense of moral crisis. Consider, for instance, anti-Internet crusader Zhang 
Chunliang, who described the incident that originally spurred his interest in fighting 
Internet addiction.
[I saw] a mother, aged somewhat over fifty, enter the wang ba with a despairing 
expression on her face. She walked over to her son’s computer, but her son remained 
absorbed, staring at the exciting game on the computer screen, shouting over and over, 
“I’ll kill you! I’ll kill you!” He had absolutely no awareness of his mother’s arrival, 
and when his mother realized this she threw herself on her knees before her son, say-
ing “Son, Mama is begging you, let’s go to class, Mama has been looking for you for 
a week. . . .” Having said this she burst into terrible sobs. The sound of her sobs was 
heartbreaking. (as cited in Tian Bingxin, 2005).
Several aspects of this short vignette will be familiar to readers of Western 
accounts of Internet addiction: the distraught mother, for instance, or the isolated 
male child absorbed in violent emotions. What may strike Western readers as 
strange, however, is where the mother wants to take the child: not back to the fam-
ily home, but to school. As unusual as this choice may seem to Western readers, 
we would claim that it exemplifies the moral crisis that many Chinese face today.
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At issue are changing notions of success and the role the Internet plays in distracting 
children from their schoolwork and other activities necessary to lead to success.
The idea that the concept of Internet addiction is tied to threats to parental 
authority and changing forms of self-expression of young people is bolstered by the 
earlier work of Zhao Bin on television and youth consumerism in China in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Zhao found that over 85% of the respondents to his survey 
controlled the amount of time they allowed their children to watch television, and 
over 90% of families limited their children’s viewing time to less than 2 hr a day 
(Zhao, 1996, pp. 645–646). Zhao’s interviews and survey work indicated “behind 
the strict control by parents over the time children spend watching television . . . 
is the fear that television causes poor school performance” (p. 641). In fact, Zhao 
found that “pressure to perform well at school had already trickled down to children 
as young as six” (p. 641).
Zhao placed this anxiety that new forms of consumption will threaten student 
achievement in the context of changing relations between parents and children. In 
a study of the brief rage for Transformer toys, Zhao and Murdock (1996) found 
“the shifting balance between individualism and responsibility, the increasingly 
blurred line between parental care and indulgence and the erosion of filial piety” 
(p. 215) were key factors in shifting notions of the proper relationship of children 
to parents. Parents raising children under China’s one-child policy had come of age 
during the Cultural Revolution whose “lost past . . . has to be compensated for by a 
better future, which lies in the only child” (Zhao, 1996, p. 644). The result was the 
metaphor of single children as “little emperors” (xiao huangdi): ambivalent objects 
that were simultaneously “spoilt, self-centered, wilful, extravagant, and sometimes 
‘despotic’” while being “the sole bearer of parental hope” (Zhao, 1996, p. 645). In 
the late 1980s and early 90s, tensions between parents and children were played 
out over whether hard-earned savings ought to be spent on an Optimus Prime or 
Skyscream transformer. In contemporary China, this tension was expressed as 
teenagers seeking to define their own identity through consumption practices that 
required autonomy from, rather than dependence on, parents.
We can see how these concerns with the success of children and children’s own 
forms of self-expression become entangled in the everyday lives of people by exam-
ining the story of a woman participating in a public online interview with media 
figure Dr. Tao Hongkai (Lan Hua, 2004). The mother of an 18-year-old, this woman 
asked for help from Dr. Tao to help her son “bring his grades up” so that he could 
attend college. She claimed,
He has grand ambitions (his goal for the college entrance exam was Wuhan University, 
and for students from Jiangsu, Wuhan University only admits those who get over 600 
on their exam), but he lacks any actual movement toward hard work [chi ku پેΔ 
lit. “eating bitterness”]. His inclination toward play is too great; he doesn’t finish the 
homework his teacher gives him, because play is more important.
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Her attempts to communicate with her son have so far been in vain.
When we go to talk to him, he won’t pay attention to us; when we write him letters and 
leave them on his desk, he tears them up and throws them in the waste-paper basket; 
we’ve been in frequent touch with his teachers, and asked them to talk to him, but in 
front of his teachers he is like a lukewarm pot of water, totally unresponsive. By now, 
it is very difficult for us to enter into his inner world, or to get him to explain what is 
going on in his mind.
Her son’s main activities—going online and playing basketball—were the cause of 
his difficulties, leading to vanity and lack of a work ethic.
Last semester there were a number of times that he skipped his evening review class 
to “steep” himself in the wang ba, and this semester, whenever he has time off on a 
Sunday afternoon, he goes to the wang ba. If you tell him not to go, he doesn’t listen, 
or says he’s going to school but in the end, we have to go to the wang ba to find him. 
Every afternoon between the time that school gets out and his evening review class, he 
has an hour of free time, and he just plays an hour of basketball, never eating anything, 
but only buys some snacks after his evening class is over; he’s also very concerned 
about his physical appearance, and spends time in front of the mirror every day.
Finally, he is distracted by the opposite sex.
Every day when his evening review class gets out, he always gets home six or seven 
minutes later than the others; there’s a female classmate that he walks home with, and 
in order to keep her company, he walks a long way out of his way to get home. One 
time, the two of them actually went to buy snacks at the night market and were 40 
minutes late getting home. When I brought it up [to him] he slammed his hand on the 
table and said “Aren’t my grades just a little bit low?”
Internet addiction here is only part of a more general disorder on the part of the 
woman’s son—his inability to excel in school, his obsession with his appearance, 
his lack of filial piety, and his interest in girls. This concern with the Internet in 
wasting productive time is similar to the verb used to describe what youth do in 
wang ba: they pao (ऐ). Pao literally means “bubble” (blister or soap bubble) but 
also describes the action of boiling water or effervescence in soft drinks—ephemeral 
and having no lasting effect. To a certain extent, we can say that Internet addicts 
“fritter” away their time at Internet cafés, but pao can also be translated as “steep” 
(the action performed by tea leaves in boiling water): an image of the dissolution of 
concentrated efficacy and flavor out of a body and into the wider environment. This 
imagery is perfectly suited for metaphors of addiction that emphasize drowning and 
immersion in a liquid medium.
The co-production of Internet addiction with anxiety about the success of chil-
dren can also be seen in youth responses to discourses of Internet addiction. Youth 
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often reject narratives of addiction as overly conservative and close minded. Thus 
if Zhang Chunliang deploys imagery of the fall of the Qing dynasty, the following 
comments accessed from a pro-Zhang Chunliang blog are critical.
It’s because there are too many people like you, that my family came to misunderstand 
me; it used to be that once a week or so I could do a little MC [Molten Core, a high-
level instance in World of Warcraft], and play a little W3 [Warcraft 3]. Now they only 
have to see the appearance of the word “Warcraft” and everything is off limits. As long 
as China has people like you in it, it will never develop; it seems that people like you 
have forgotten how the Qing dynasty fell. (Liu Han, 2006) 
The fall of the Qing is blamed not on opium here but on Chinese inability to 
embrace new technologies and employ them against colonial forces. The writer 
is implicitly referring to the last decades of the Qing dynasty, when the Empress 
Dowager Cixi allowed her court eunuchs to appropriate money intended to modernize 
the outdated Chinese navy, which had been the vehicle of China’s humiliation at the 
hands of the British in the Opium Wars. Instead, the money was spent on building the 
elaborate summer palace known as the Yiheyuan (咡ࡉ㥀) (Spence, 1990, p. 229). 
Like an empress blinkered by traditional notions, antigames crusaders refuse to learn 
from the outside world, and thus doom China to a subordinate status.
Others have commented in forums protesting the pathologization of leisure time 
by pointing out the similarity of Internet games to sport, considered here in its mor-
ally positive modality.
You really are unbelievably stupid; why can’t this country accept this new sport? It’s 
precisely because there are people like you. Look at South Korea, which has no one 
[like you], they have respect for their top gamers. Isn’t soccer a game? There are 
schools that have banned soccer, so why does everyone still take it seriously? Sports 
are general [why should they be] only limited to the body? You’re a destructive insect 
[๣ۧ, “mulberry-borer”] in our midst! I really advise you to buy a magazine and learn 
to understand electronic gaming, [since] you’re really nothing compared to those who 
do. Don’t be a frog at the bottom of a well all your life! (Liu Han, 2006)
Again, the proverbial image of the frog at the bottom of the well is used to empha-
size the isolation and narrow perspective of those who oppose social and techno-
logical innovation. Thus, in sum, concerns about Internet addiction and pathologies 
arising from it reflect more than just sensitivity to well-publicized tragedies such 
as Internet suicide. Instead, they reflect the fact that the Internet provides a space 
where youth can experiment with their identities and social relationships beyond 
their controlling parents. Games, in particular, are spaces that offer the pleasure of 
play without the responsibilities foisted on youth by parents.
Weber’s (2000) research on Chinese youth seems to underscore this sense of the 
younger generation’s ambivalent response to responsibility.
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I think the greatest difference between the past two generations is responsibility. In the 
past generation, the people were very united in their hearts as Chinese. They regarded 
duty as very important and they take [sic] greater responsibility toward their family. . . . 
But now, the current generation has taken ideas that are more like western values from 
mediums like television and books. They are not willing to take responsibility for some 
things, especially those things that do not concern themselves. (p. 42)
The idea that MMOGs provide an escape from an otherwise stressful life can be 
seen in extracts from Wu, Fore, and Wang’s (2007) study on in-game marriages. In 
this study, people who were asked about their motives in undertaking virtual mar-
riage emphasize the lack of stress and responsibility that online experience provides: 
“It’s just for fun, it’s different from the reality, having a lot of fantasy—besides, 
it saves money. It’s horrible to get married in reality”; “In-game marriage is only 
a game; you can play and get high, but you don’t need to take it seriously”; and 
“Because in real life we are all afraid to get married, but in the game, we can do 
something we are afraid to do and take no responsibility for it” (p. 76). In Internet 
marriages documented by Wu, participants engage in consumerist, heteronormative 
behavior but without the high stakes of real-life marriage. This fact, like the presence 
of morally transgressive activity (killing other players, stealing items, etc.) and the 
shunning of gender-switching avatars, simultaneously challenges bourgeois norms 
of respectability even as it reinscribes them.
Conclusion
We have attempted to provide a preliminary description of the cause and shape of 
contemporary discourse about Internet suicide and video game addiction in China. 
In contrast to typical accounts of Internet addiction as a biomedical disorder, we 
argue that the rise of Internet addiction as a social problem is part of an ongoing 
realignment of moral relations in contemporary Chinese society. Internet addiction 
as a phenomenon must be understood as more than a medical object.
Internet addiction has emerged alongside several larger social and political trends 
in the contemporary People’s Republic of China. Although portrayed as the pathology 
of the individual sufferer, Internet addiction has become a phenomenon through 
which Chinese people moot profound moral changes that shape the nation as a whole. 
The attention given to the Internet as a source of moral danger reflects Chinese 
concerns with the recuperation and development of their country and the role youth 
will play. Just as the Qing empire experienced morally ambivalent accommodation 
with global modernity, so too people in contemporary China experience consumerist 
lifestyles and the proliferation of new information technologies as full of both risk 
and promise.
It is important not to trivialize the loss of life that has occurred from Internet-
related deaths, just as it is important to recognize the real potential for pathological 
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behavior that may occur from exposure to the Internet. Nevertheless, we argue that 
the discourse of Internet addiction cannot be seen merely as a “mirror of true reality.” 
Whatever Internet addiction may or may not be, as a diagnostic category it reflects and 
is buttressed by social changes in Chinese society. It will be tempting for scientists and 
the public to gloss over the wider issues with which Internet addiction is co-produced in 
China. But to relegate the study of Internet addiction to a narrowly conceived research 
program in biomedical psychology would be, as Sahlins (1976) once said, “a kind of 
bargin made with reality in which an understanding of the phenomenon is gained at the 
cost of everything we know about it” (p. 15). Studies of Internet addiction must explore 
the phenomenon thoroughly from a variety of disciplinary viewpoints if the phenomenon 
can be understood in its entirety. In this promissory piece, we have attempted to 
demonstrate that a social scientific approach based in anthropology and sociology must 
be a necessary component of this exploration. Any future research in this area must 
address not only the clinical data on Internet addiction but also the sociocultural context 
with which it is co-produced.
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